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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4366 
___________ 
 
BAO JIN DI FENG, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A79-321-097) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind Malloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 20, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Bao Jin Di Feng, proceeding pro se, seeks review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny his petition for review. 
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I. 
 Feng, a citizen of China, allegedly entered the United States in May 2000.  In May 
2001, Feng applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”), alleging that his wife had suffered a forced abortion in China due to 
their resistance to China’s coercive population policies.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) made an 
adverse credibility determination and denied relief.  The BIA affirmed, and Feng did not 
appeal that decision.  Feng filed a motion to reopen, which the BIA denied in March 2004.  
With that motion, Feng submitted a photocopied divorce decree certificate that apparently also 
assigned him “guardian” status of his daughter.  The BIA was skeptical that the decree was 
authentic, but concluded that, even assuming it was authentic, it did not undermine the BIA’s 
affirmance of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.   
Feng filed a second motion to reopen in March 2011, arguing that he will be persecuted 
if removed to China due to his participation in Falun Gong activities since 2008, which was 
made public in a July 2010 news article.  The BIA denied the motion in November 2011, 
finding that it was both untimely and number-barred.  Feng filed a timely petition for review 
and a motion to stay removal.  We denied the stay motion and now deny the petition for 
review.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the denial of a motion to 
reopen.  We review such denials for abuse of discretion.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, 
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irrational, or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. 
A petitioner may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of a final order of 
removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i).  To file a motion to reopen beyond the ninety-day 
limit, a movant must show “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in 
the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not 
available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); see also Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Feng claims that the BIA denied him due process and abused its discretion by failing to 
give weight to his new evidence of changed conditions in China.  He argues that the 
background materials on China demonstrate that the Chinese government instituted a 
crackdown on Falun Gong practitioners in the months leading up to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. 
The BIA correctly determined that Feng failed to satisfy the exception to the ninety-day 
limitation period for motions to reopen.  The BIA considered Feng’s evidence, but noted that, 
while China’s harassment and periodic crackdowns on Falun Gong practitioners continue, 
there has been no material change in China’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners since 
Feng’s 2002 hearing.  Rather, the BIA correctly found, the only change shown is in Feng’s 
personal circumstances, given that by his own account his participation in Falun Gong began in 
2008.  Accordingly, Feng has not demonstrated that the BIA abused its discretion in denying 
his motion. 
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 The BIA also declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.  To the extent Feng claims 
the BIA abused its discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review that determination.  See Calle-
Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  He has made no showing that his case 
presents an “exceptional situation.”  See id.  Furthermore, his case is not one in which the BIA 
has announced and followed “a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be 
governed” that would have created an exception to the jurisdictional bar.  See id. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
